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Abstract

This article examines the operations of visual representations within discourses advocating deextinction.
Images have significant agency within these debates, yet their roles, and the assumptions they naturalise, have
not been critiqued. Demonstrating the affective, triumphant and subversive potentials of these
representations, this article then turns to the implications of relying on images made by and for humans within
the expressly multispecies space of de-extinction. Discourses around de-extinction tend to place undue weight
not just on how candidate species look(ed), but on how they appear to human eyes after the mediating
processes of representation, and the notion of recreating a nonhuman animal that looks the same as an extinct
species is not only limited as an aim of de-extinction technologies, but is problematised when different
species’ modes of seeing and optical capacities are taken into account. Furthermore, vision cannot necessarily
be assumed to play the same role within the sociality of species being reproduced as it does for the humans
seeking to instigate these de-extinctions, and this article seeks to situate these imbalances in de-extinction
discourses within humanistic ‘sensory hierarchies’ which have pervaded the domain of cultural
representations, including museums and technology. Animal agency thus raises questions about these spheres,
and emerges as having the potential to disrupt certain approaches to de-extinction. This article therefore seeks
to reframe questions of what ‘success’ might mean in relation to de-extinction, and argues for the
acknowledgement of ‘multispecies phenomenologies’ as an obstruction to the insistent anthropocentrism of
the de-extinctionist gaze.
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Introduction
This article examines the deployment of visual representations within discourses seeking to
popularise de-extinction, and situates pictorial sources within broader representational
conventions that both extend and obscure understandings of extinct species. ‘De-extinction’ is
an emerging and controversial field of science which includes among its goals the restoration of
extinct species, and some even refer to it as ‘resurrection biology’. Focusing in particular on
images of extinct animals, this article explores how these participate in economies of affect
within de-extinction discourses, and mediate their current limits through the reification of an
insistent anthropocentrism. As Laura McMahon observes of the ‘meat industrial complex’
(relating to intensive livestock farming under capitalism), this ‘functions not only through the
biopolitical management of animal life but also through a rigid control of regimes of visibility’
(206), and I trace a similar process at work in the field of de-extinction. However, visual
cultures of de-extinction have additional implications for potential animal lives and experiences,
not least in the appropriation of images as proxies for species that can no longer be observed
alive. Visual representations thus have significant agency within how these species are
remembered, as well as in terms of how biotechnological futures, and the lives of formerlyextinct genetically ‘rescued’ animals, are both envisaged and evaluated. Images inform technical
aspects of trying to recreate lost species, at the same time as they promote an optical
essentialism, which privileges the human viewer and frequently characterises projections of how
creatures resulting from de-extinction experiments might be judged. In turn, particularly within
the framework of de-extinction, the limits of images are illuminated through a consideration of
animal agency – something indeed that remains largely unacknowledged in discourses advocating
for de-extinction. This article therefore emphasises animal agency, positioning it as a critique of
the de-extinctionist gaze and fundamental to debates around the futures of lost species.
The visual records on which conceptualisations of extinct species are based – even the
representations that have secured legitimacy within scientific circles – are unstable and
distorting, and this raises significant questions for de-extinction science, especially when images
are used uncritically to guide this technology. However, this article zooms out from this concern
to think more broadly about the appropriation of images within de-extinction debates.
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Appearance seems to be central within the rhetoric, practices, and appraisals of de-extinction,
and in addition to the distorting and selective nature of images being overlooked in this context,
visual economies surrounding this field of science are also unscrutinised, including what sort of
norms and assumptions are naturalised both by the types and prevalence of these
representations. This article seeks to address these themes, in particular by highlighting the
limits of images, their fundamental incompleteness in the context of animal experience, and how
the overtly visual emphasis within discourses popularising de-extinction obscures the relevance
of other sensory considerations. This emphasis insistently inscribes anthropocentric
preoccupations onto proposed communities of nonhuman animals whose needs and perceptual
make-up often differ significantly from those of humans. Calling for a posthumanist critique of
popular discourses of de-extinction and the power relations these both reflect and reinforce, this
article argues for the acknowledgement of spaces of multispecies difference among the other
unknowns of de-extinction.
Focusing on de-extinction discourses that seek to describe this field to general
audiences, rather than on the considerable scientific advances that have been made in various
laboratories internationally, this analysis takes its central case studies from Beth Shapiro’s 2015
book How To Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-extinction, and some of the talks advocating for
de-extinction at the TEDx DeExtinction conference that took place on 15 March 2013 in
Washington DC, in connection with National Geographic and The Long Now Foundation’s
Revive & Restore project. While Shapiro’s book is not particularly heavy on plates and figures,
and contains no pictures that expressly imagine a de-extinct animal, images haunt Shapiro’s text.
Issues relating to appearances of both specimens and hypothetical futures are repeatedly raised,
both embedded within the technical processes described, and in the context of more open-ended
questions about what precisely de-extinction might mean. To some extent, the composition of
Shapiro’s narrative traces several of the genetic rescue projects presented at the TEDx event,
and both these sources see scientists engaged in the de-extinction research communicating and
attempting to popularise their work. My focus on these sources (instead of examining their
scientific research directly) responds to the platitude by some proponents of de-extinction that
the decision as to whether to pursue these technologies or not ultimately lies with the public
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(see, for example, Brand). This therefore puts particular emphasis on how these ideas are being
communicated to this general audience, and necessitates that public-facing discussions be
exhaustive regarding both the advantages and the problems of de-extinction. However, how
public consensus is to be sought or even estimated remains unclear, and in the meantime deextinction experiments are being pushed forward at speed, despite wide-ranging objections to
these from both some members of the scientific community and some members of the public.
While the purposely-accessible content of both the conference and the book is shaped
by an apparent desire to engage a wide audience, their formats imply a relative lack of
journalistic mediation. However, sensationalising tactics associated with media representation
are apparent in the narratives constructed, not least in their use of images, and in some of their
titles.1 Furthermore, the cultural fascinations tapped into regarding the idea of extinct species
returning have in themselves been fostered to a significant extent by visual cultures, including
books and films such as Jurassic Park, which is frequently mentioned – often with some irony – in
discussions of de-extinction (see Horner and Gorman, 7-8; Zimmer; Shapiro, 45, 112). That
‘icons’ of de-extinction research – such as the ‘pickled pup’ publicised as part of the Australian
Museum’s abortive Thylacine Cloning Project of 1999-2005 – play a role as popularisers for
reaching wider audiences has been pointed out by Amy Fletcher (80), and Jamie Lorimer has
noted more generally how celebrated species are often known primarily through
representations: ‘Western publics are much more likely to encounter the charismatic organisms
about which they are so concerned in print, online, or on TV than they are to meet them in the
flesh’ (119). However, this article focuses on the different categories of images within deextinction discourses, and the ensemble of forces these exert. Furthermore, I argue that a major
effect visual representations have is in terms of what they cannot do, on account of the sensory
information they are unable to record. These omissions are concealed by representations’
ubiquity, the excessive credibility with which they are treated, and the visual ecologies within
which images exist (including museums and technology) – as are variations in the perceptional
landscapes that different species inhabit.
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Visual representation and the de-extinctionist gaze
In de-extinction discourses, images bear the representational burden of what cannot be seen,
either because it is too microscopic or concealed, or because it is no longer around. Arguably by
definition, species undergoing de-extinction do not exist in the present, and current candidate
species are nearly all species past, which – some believe – will become species future. This
absence affects the symbolism of representations that de-extinction discourses call upon to fill
the voids, and as unverifiable ‘likenesses’, these images are both freighted and liberated from
certain orders of scrutiny. As this discussion seeks to show, there are complex economies of
affect within visual cultures of de-extinction, which enlist a range of representational tropes.
These animate a narrative that frames de-extinction discourses as existing in a present that is an
hiatus within a candidate species’ unfolding history. The images used appear to have been
selected with a view to legitimising experiments in de-extinction, and they popularise the field’s
long-term goal via sanitised renderings of a post-de-extinction future. Acting in conjunction
with notions of ‘moral responsibility’, an oft-repeated justification for de-extinction science,
different modes within these representations create dynamics of repulsion and attraction,
compunction and confidence, which propel the message that – albeit in different ways, or to
differing extents – extinct species should be given a ‘second chance’ (for example, Archer).
Phrases such as this ventriloquise for candidate species, and misrepresent their agency within deextinction debates. At the centre of these discourses, however, is anthropocentric ambition: the
species whose representations – and, eventually, bodies – constitute the case-studies are
currently silent, odourless, and obscured.
Not all of the presentations at the 2013 TEDx conference advocated that de-extinction
be pursued, though trenchant criticism of the idea was confined to only a few of them. One of
these was David Ehrenfeld’s stark and sceptical talk titled ‘Extinction Reversal? Don’t Count On
It’, and it is significant that this was one of the only ones not accompanied by slides (Ehrenfeld
2013). His closing remarks, delivered in front of a dark, blank screen, cautioned audiences to
‘ease off on the hype: hype can come back to bite you’, and served as a contrast to the way in
which many of the other talks, buoyed by images, were cultivating precisely that. The nature of
this hype, however, and its construction via a jumble of representational modes, deserves closer
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attention. The talks advocating de-extinction presented a hybrid visual culture in which different
tropes and approaches indicate the images’ differing conditions of production. In addition to
technical diagrams, including those that illuminate molecular interactions, and photographs
representing landmark technological advances within de-extinction science (such as Dolly, the
first cloned sheep), many of the images featured within the TEDx talks (and in other discussions
promoting de-extinction) were of species lost to extinction. The images fall into a number of
overlapping categories, depending in part upon the extinction date of the species depicted: there
are representations made before a species went extinct, such as the photograph of Martha, the
last passenger pigeon, who died in Cincinnati Zoo; there are representations made only after a
species has disappeared, reconstructing and imagining their forms from biological matter and
scientific information, such as the majority of mammoth imagery;2 and there are representations
created after a species’ extinction, but based on accounts and depictions made while the species
still existed.3 Furthermore, specimens such as taxidermy, skins, and remains also constitute
representations as well as being artefacts of natural histories, and in these, molecular
information cohabits with visual clues.4
The narrative arc of many arguments in favour of de-extinction is reflected in the
varying operations of these different categories of representation. There is an especial sense of
elegiac reproach from images made during the lifetimes of the species featured, as they have
travelled through time in a way that their subjects have not; somewhere within the social history
of these pictures, the species they represent have slipped away, or been deliberately
exterminated. These images in particular raise questions of human culpability: they bear witness
to the fact that the species was known and observed before all members of the species died. In
this way, these representations tap into the sense of guilt that de-extinction proponents
frequently evoke when pointing out humans’ responsibility for many extinctions (likely to
garner further support for their cause). This type of extinction imagery confronts audiences with
the wronged animal, which is sometimes framed as an individual, sometimes as a representative
of their species, and sometimes as both. The photograph of Martha, reproduced in Shapiro’s
book, suggests how narrative and representations intertwine. While accounts of the passenger
pigeon – including that assembled in Ben Novak’s TEDx talk – often emphasise its force as a

85

MAKING SENSE?
species prior to the birds’ systematic destruction, including their tendency to travel in enormous
flocks that could sometimes take several hours to pass overhead, Martha is captive and alone.
Her isolation is emphasised by her small size relative to the frame of the image; she appears
vulnerable and exposed, pale and ghost-like against a space etched with shade. Poignantly,
shadows on the back wall of her enclosure (possibly including her own, though otherwise
shadows of different birds) suggest a species memory of sociality5 – a way of life extinguished for
an endling, even those in the wild. Photographs, with their overtly indexical quality stemming
from the ‘imprinting’ of reflected light (see Gunning, 40), arguably heighten viewers’ sense of
connection and proximity to the subject, and by extension their sense of loss.
If audiences feel compunction when confronted with icons of anthropogenic
environmental violence such as Martha, narratives advocating de-extinction often then turn to
the idea of ‘solutions’. Moving away from melancholy around lost biodiversity, visual cultures
that accompany notions of how humans might, through science, atone for ecological sins 6 tend
to promote a sense of wonder and optimism. As well as diagrams showing the ingenuity of DNA
research, which serve as what McMahon has termed ‘display[s] of biopower’ (206), the images
that traffic in this hope offer visions of a biotechnological future wherein formerly extinct
animals have returned, and are thriving. These representations do not necessarily have to have
been made with de-extinction in mind – many of the images used in this way have previously
operated to give insights into species past. However, when framed within the context of deextinction debates, a museum’s recreation of a woolly mammoth, for example, takes on an
ambiguous temporal ‘otherness’ which suggests a space somewhere between the past and the
future, but not the present. A mammoth image used in George Church’s TEDx presentation
illustrates these transformative effects of changing the context of a representation. Embedded
within a slide presenting technical information are two juxtaposed images, one of an elephant
and the other of a mammoth (Church 2013). Although their sources are not cited, the
mammoth picture appears to be a photograph of a diorama in the Royal British Columbia
Museum, taken from the viewing perspective of an average-height person. This vantage suggests
the awe-inspiring scale of the mammoth, as well as acting as a metaphor for the anthropocentric
terms by which humans represent and engage animal others. While the stagecraft of dioramas is
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seldom convincing when viewed in person, surrounded by museological paraphernalia, when
framed by the camera this display excels in its suggestion of icy tundra stretching for hundreds of
miles into the distance. Through this the mammoth model too appears animated, caught in the
instant of a photograph rather than still and breathless as it would appear to museum goers
observing it for longer. With its stormy-looking clouds (and possibly a hint of the Aurora
Borealis), the surrounding weather and landscape rendered by the diorama heighten the drama
of the representation, as does the lighting of the display – effects especially potent when
translated into the photograph. These contrasts of light and shade construct a highly-resolved,
detailed image which projects a verisimilitude for the mammoth that is in fact difficult to verify
exactly – something underscored by the many variations within mammoth imagery. However,
as Linda Nochlin argues in a seminal essay of postcolonial art history, highly-finished renderings
containing ‘a plethora of authenticating details’ carry the association of truth, giving them the
power to convince substantially beyond the actual accuracy of the scene (Nochlin, 38).
Furthermore, in the context of de-extinction discourses, this representation of the mammoth
projects certainty and scientific triumph through the evocation of a technofuturist sublime,
even alongside more measured claims about the technologies currently available, and
those anticipated.
As a photograph of a diorama within a natural history museum, this mammoth image
blurs distinctions between two of the categories of extinct animal representations suggested
above. Part model, part remains, it is a hybrid confection that, when photographed, takes on
qualities reminiscent of magic realism7 as the clarity of the image contends with the wondrous
alterity of what it depicts. Representations that also combine reconstruction and remains,
though markedly different in affect, are photographs of the exhumation of the Jarkov mammoth
in 1999, an event that Shapiro discusses in her book. For context, a theme through a significant
part of the book’s narrative is the quest, by various scientific teams, to find intact nuclei in
preserved mammoth tissues. Shapiro is skeptical of this aim, but describes a series of discoveries
in which remarkably-preserved specimens raise hopes – both among some scientists and in the
media – for a range of technological breakthroughs. Particularly interesting are Shapiro’s
observations of a tendency to correlate anatomical completeness of specimens with the
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intactness of the DNA contained within. As Shapiro notes in a discussion of mummified remains
found in permafrost:
Although the record of DNA preservation in mummies is startlingly poor, we can’t
seem to separate the remarkable physical preservation of their bodies from the idea that
their DNA must, somehow, be equally well preserved. With each find, there is renewed
enthusiasm that this mummy will be the one that defies the odds. (84)
On some level, of course, this seems sensible – the processes that fragment the body correlate
with those that fragment the DNA inside. However, the assumptions that the inverse is also true
persist despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, some of which Shapiro describes. One
way to interpret the endurance of this supposition is that it demonstrates the power of
appearances. As Shapiro acknowledges, these can be highly persuasive, even to experts who have
significant evidence contradicting what these appearances imply. It is in this context that the
images of the transportation of the Jarkov mammoth, following his removal from the ground,
should be considered. To keep the specimen as well-preserved as possible, a huge, rough cube of
the frozen earth around him was cut from the permafrost. Before this was transported, dangling
beneath a helicopter, to a facility where it could be stored, explorer and mammoth enthusiast
Bernard Buigues installed tusks found near the body on one side of the block, creating the
convincing illusion that just within its confines stood the complete beast, on the threshold of
being revealed. This action created a media-friendly spectacle which suggests the importance of
publicity to this sort of scientific research, as well as the awareness that a striking icon such as
this would compound it – the removal of the mammoth from the permafrost was already being
funded by the Discovery Channel, which hoped he would be cloned (Shapiro, 85-86). Shapiro
notes that in fixing the tusks to the block, Buigues acted partly ‘because it made the pictures and
video even more impressive’, and that he acknowledged it was ‘creative license’ (85). Indeed,
Shapiro underscores that:
[t]hey knew that the mammoth carcass in the block of ice was incomplete. They had
already removed the head, for example, which had partially thawed and begun to rot.
They had also used ground-penetrating radar to try to see beneath the surface, and the
results hinted that less than a complete mammoth was preserved within. (85)
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Defrosting the block brought further disappointment, revealing scant remains8 which dashed the
plans of scientists who hoped this specimen might be the one to yield the material necessary to
make a significant breakthrough in mammoth de-extinction.
Regardless of Buigues’ specific intentions in putting the tusks on the block to make them
appear as if protruding from within, the optics of what resulted sets in train a series of meanings.
This assembled object is read as much in terms of what cannot be seen as in terms of what can –
viewers’ perceptions of a complete mammoth body standing within the block rely both on the
opacity of its surface, and on what the positioned tusks suggest. This dialectic of evidence and
concealment speaks to the way in which all images, to varying degrees, evoke their subjects by
way of a combination of the seen and the unseen. James Elkins has explored this idea, and asserts
that ‘blindnesses are the constant companions of seeing and even the very condition of seeing
itself’ (13) – a claim that has various additional implications in terms of visual cultures of deextinction. Furthermore, the Jarkov object – as part-found, part-constructed – resonates with
Surrealist practices of image-making,9 which frequently involved assemblage, and with their
exploration of notions such as ‘the uncanny’. Often associated with pyschoanalysis pioneer
Sigmund Freud, but variously explored by other thinkers, artists and writers, this concept tends
to be applied to things occupying the unsettling hinterland between animate and inanimate,
between living and dead (like realistic mannequins, for instance). Such things, Freud suggests,
are aesthetically compelling and frightening, prompting simultaneous fascination and dread (see
Freud 2003). Often comprising parts rather than wholes, uncanny objects stop short of being
convincingly lifelike, and the concept is often summarised as ‘the familiar made strange’ (see,
for example, Huskinson, 3). This – or perhaps, ‘the strange made familiar’ – resonates with the
tusked block containing the Jarkov mammoth, especially when it is framed in the context of deextinction discourses.10 This is because de-extinction narratives draw on a similar uncertainty
between dead and animate, between specimen and living individual, and tout the notion of
return, which is also a facet of the uncanny. For Freud, this return might be of the dead (Freud
2003), or of things repressed, such as he believed of visions during déjà-vu. The uncanniness of
de-extinction lies in both its aims and its representational sources: some, such as animal
specimens in museums, already align with this concept, and this is compounded by the
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possibility that they contain materials through which their species might be raised from the dead.
The uncanny nature of the entombed Jarkov mammoth, as well as of ideas of de-extinction
generally, stems from their oscillation between – or simultaneous projection of – fearsomeness
and allure. This suggests an ‘extinct uncanny’ within visual cultures of de-extinction, whereby
representations powerfully destabilise previous certainties such as the finality of death and
extinction. Furthermore, the concealed Jarkov mammoth offers a metaphor for the deceptions
of representation more broadly – what is read from an image, for example, is as much about
what is not visible as about what is.
In addition to the categories outlined above, there is a fifth kind of extinction image.
Unlike the others, this category of representation arises specifically as a result of de-extinction
technologies and related research, and yet it is rarely included in public-facing discourses seeking
to popularise de-extinction. Comprising images of the results – expected or otherwise – of deextinction attempts, this category is conspicuous by its relative absence in de-extinction
discourses. This is apparently not for want of such images – the birth in 2003 of the clone of
Celia, the bucarda endling who had died three years previously, is widely heralded as the first
successful de-extinction.11 Significantly, however, popular descriptions of this milestone are
seldom accompanied by a photograph of the cloned kid, who only survived for a few minutes. If
images accompany this story, they tend to feature a healthy-looking living bucardo. An
examination of some of the photographs of the cloned kid suggest why this might be: while the
narrative presents a story of triumph, the images suggest something else. While the clone’s live
birth represents a significant scientific achievement, her own experience appears to have been
traumatic and painful. Towards the end of his presentation at the 2013 TEDx conference, titled
‘The First De-extinction’, Alberto Fernández-Arias showed three images of Celia’s young clone.
These begin with a photograph of her birth via caesarian section, its heavily-assisted nature
crowding the frame of the image, and end with a photograph taken shortly after, in which she is
dead. Laid on her side next to a tape measure, under hard lighting and a camera positioned
directly above, the image is dispassionate and clinical, and her somewhat curled posture evokes
fearfulness. The directness of this image induces a different kind of pathos to that effected by
pictures of animals before they went extinct; here we see the body of an individual that has
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struggled and suffered, rather than an animal less aware of their fate, an icon of more distant
violence. The middle photograph, presumably taken last, shows her severely deformed lungs,
removed from her body and measured. These glisten viscerally under the camera flash, a stark
symbol of failings within the project12 and mysteries as yet unsolved by science, including those
around gene expression. Further, the huge extra lobe on the lung suggests the familiar made
strange, an ‘epigenetic uncanny’ which appears like a ‘return of the repressed’ within the
genome (unlike her clone, Celia’s lungs gave her viable life). Removed from the clone’s body,
these organs assume an unsettling trans-species relatability, to which can be applied Gilles
Deleuze’s brutal notion that ‘[m]eat is the common zone of man and the beast, their zone of
indiscernibility’ (23). Indeed, these three images of the cloned bucarda kid raise with immediacy
the question of animal rights so often given only cursory treatment – if it is raised at all – when
proponents of de-extinction attempt to popularise their work. Instead, their narratives and
representations tend to offer a sanitised portrayal, consciously or otherwise curated to appeal to
viewers’ senses of wonder. Celia’s clone is likely the de-extinction breakthrough that is most
impressive to general audiences, yet her photograph is not a headlining image within these
discourses; instead, when it is used, it unmasks the optimism that thrives on the omissions and
abstractions of the verbal summary of facts, and raises questions about who exactly it is that
benefits when de-extinction experiments produce ‘results’. Within the anthropocentric
narratives of de-extinction, the clone’s image troubles the implicit triumphalism of many
accounts of her existence.

The anthropocentric archive
What emerges through the examples described above is the agency of visual representations
within discourses seeking to popularise de-extinction – be this in support of, or subverting,
optimistic projections for the future of these technologies (which are premised upon the relative
silence over what this will mean for the experiences of the animals involved). Because images
have the potential to work in both directions, they are selected or omitted in broad alignment
with the inflection of the narrative they accompany. Of primary significance here is not
necessarily the extent to which such curation is intentional on the part of proponents of de91
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extinction; rather, it is how such discourses might read to audiences. However, while images are
powerful, they are also profoundly limited. De-extinction is by definition recreation across
species lines, with humans trying to remake nonhuman animals, yet detailed records of
candidate species’ sensory experiences, and capacities for these, are not only missing from
images, but are arguably obscured by the ubiquity of the visual within de-extinction discourses.
Not only can images distort our understandings of extinct species, but they threaten to promote
an excessive opticality in how de-extinction experiments are implemented and evaluated. In
discourses advocating de-extinction, for example, there is an overwhelming focus on how
animals produced through these technologies will ‘look and act’ (see, for example, Shapiro, 1214). This phrase recurs throughout Shapiro’s book, and admittedly both of these terms can be
broad. However, other attributes and senses upon which intra- and interspecies interactions
depend are neglected in de-extinction discourses. The question of scent, for example – species’
olfactory capacities, how they smell to their peers, and what role this might play within
communication – is not discussed at the TEDx conference, nor in Shapiro’s book. This omission
is striking, especially given the centrality of smell in the sensory landscapes of so many animals,
and its key role in how these species live. In the absence of public-facing discussions about this,
yet in the light of questions surrounding epigenetic and environmental effects, whether it is
reasonable to expect that individuals within a revived species would be able to use smell in the
same way as their extinct counterparts seems unclear. Furthermore, human assessments of this,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, seem likely to fall short (given human aptitudes, significant
gaps in preserved sensory records, and currently available technologies). The discussion that
follows seeks to highlight the need for de-extinction discourses to acknowledge these lacunae, as
part of an effort towards what I am terming a ‘multispecies phenomenology’. This would insist
on attempts to consider other species’ experiences, illuminating and problematising the
anthropocentrism of assessments of such as ‘likeness’ and ‘success’, and revisiting perennial
questions about the extent to which the experiences, sensory worlds and inner lives of other
species can ever fully be understood.
Sensory perception in animals, including humans, draws on complex constellations of
interacting senses numbering considerably more than the five usually cited. However, my
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purpose here is not to give a more comprehensive account of what these are, but to highlight
how – even for the commonly acknowledged senses (seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and
tasting) – there are significant and probably unbridgeable gaps in our knowledge of extinct
species. About these species and more generally, the knowledge we have inherited from
forebears not only privileges visual (and, to some extent, sonic) information, but is mediated
and limited further by the specific sensory capacities of humans: within a given ‘sense’, different
species perceive differently. Birds, for example, see very differently to humans (Varela, Palacios
and Goldsmith, 77). Their fields of vision differ, as do their visual acuity, sensitivity, and
perception of colours, and indeed there is significant variation in these abilities between bird
species (see Birkhead, 2-32). Even focusing on colour alone, one gets a sense of how different a
bird’s world might look. As Tim Birkhead explains:
However good we (arrogantly) think our colour vision is, compared with that of birds it
is rather poor because they have four single-cone types: red, green, blue and ultraviolet
(UV). Not only do birds have more types of cone than ourselves, they have more of
them. What’s more, birds’ cone cells contain a coloured oil droplet, which may allow
them to distinguish even more colours. (24)
As this suggests, while it is recognised that birds’ colour vision differs from humans’, the full
extent to which this is the case is currently uncertain. It is unclear what such interspecies
variations mean for de-extinction attempts – partly because the popular discourses around these
are yet to address such perceptional differences. Indeed, this oversight is particularly striking in
some, such as Ben Novak’s talk at the TEDx DeExtinction conference. In this, Novak described
his plan for raising a group of recreated, parentless passenger pigeons. These, he believes, would
be socialised and learn to migrate by following a group of homing pigeons which would be dyed
to look like passenger pigeons. However, in addition to the dubious ethics of the initial process
of dyeing the birds, there are obvious nodes of weakness in his plan which were not addressed.
These include deficiencies within the visual record – even skins and taxidermy fade in colour,
and photographs and paintings are unlikely to record gradations in colour as seen by a passenger
pigeon.13 Especially given this complexity, it will not be an easy task to recreate intricately even
what humans do and can understand of a passenger pigeon’s colouration by dyeing a surrogate
93

MAKING SENSE?
species, let alone the additional colours that birds see. Aside from the question of whether these
dyed birds manage to induce juvenile passenger pigeons to join their flock, it is possible that the
applied colouration on the homing pigeons will affect how they interact with one another, and
issues such as whether they become more vulnerable to predation. Finally, could dyeing
techniques ever ensure that the recreated passenger pigeons would perceive other pigeons as
members of their own species, or even as sufficiently similar? And even if it managed to
convince visually, would things like the sounds, smells, movements and interactions of the
surrogate flock allow this illusion to be maintained, or destabilise it? It is said that flocks of
passenger pigeons were incredibly noisy – surely it is possible that it was this, or other aspects of
their flocking behaviour (or indeed some combination) instead of their appearances, that would
impel juveniles to join the group. Indeed, Susan McHugh links the mystery to humans of birds
flocking to its visually spectacular qualities, noting how flocking sees birds ‘covering territories
on their own collective terms … occupying spaces with senses and reasons that we can only
guess’ (273). While musical scores of passenger pigeon vocalisations were compiled by Wallace
Craig in 1911, in his TEDx talk Novak does not mention sound as a component of his plan to get
de-extinct passenger pigeons to bond with their surrogate community. Like images, however,
records of animal sounds are also the site of elisions and potential misrepresentations. The range
of audible frequencies varies from species to species, affecting both what gets preserved and how
recordings sound to human listeners, and – especially when notated on a standard musical stave
– animal vocalisations are strained through the structured tonality this inevitably imposes, and
which is entirely arbitrary in this context. Furthermore, Craig’s notations of passenger pigeon
vocalisations were based principally on second-hand accounts of captive birds, raising questions
about how typical or representative this collection of calls is. As this discussion of the passenger
pigeon seeks to suggest, this critique is not motivated by the pursuit of ‘exactness’ in de-extinct
animals for exactness’s sake – and indeed, this is not necessarily what de-extinction scientists are
pursuing (see, for example, Shapiro, 205). Rather, I am seeking to place animal agency at the
centre of de-extinction discourses, including with regard to questions about whether these
technologies should be pursued at all. While Novak’s focus on birds’ appearances might be
because these are easier to modify than other characteristics, this prioritisation of visuality
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mirrors other de-extinction discourses, and imposes an anthropocentric sensory hierarchy onto
passenger pigeons which disregards their subjectivity and the complexity of their inner lives.
Indeed, to some extent, humans routinely neglect complexities in their own sensory
perceptions. Certain cultural phenomena such as museums, art, aesthetics, and horticulture
reinscribe entrenched hierarchies of legitimacy when it comes to different forms of sensory
information, and while these hierarchies can vary a little between cultures, vision and sound
tend to be preserved and canonised to a far greater degree than those such as touch, taste and
smell. Already, these anthropocentric sensory hierarchies are affecting other species:
commercially-bred flowers, while exhibiting a panoply of different colours and forms, now
often lack scent in a way that their earlier cultivars did not. As Natalia Dudareva and Eran
Pichersky note, ‘[t]raits such as colour, visual attractiveness, and long shelf life have been
targeted, without any attention to whether the selected lines are still scented’ (70). Similarly,
philosophers of aesthetics have examined the Eurocentric conceit that ‘high art’ pertains
primarily to music and visual art – as Carolyn Korsmeyer has explained, ‘[i]t has long been a
commonplace in the field of aesthetics to speak of the eyes and the ears as the “aesthetic” senses.
Objects of the other senses, it is generally agreed, are not properly called “beautiful”, nor are
they the raw material out of which a “fine art” can be developed’ (67). While plenty of thinkers
dispute this and the assumptions that underlie it, this notion has proved stubborn, not least
because it was shaping cultural canons for a long time before it received critical scrutiny.
Technologies of preservation, reproduction, and communication also shape – and are
likely shaped by – these aesthetic sensory hierarchies. Museums, both in terms of what they
collect, and how taxonomies are devised, are overwhelmingly optical spaces, and typically
encourage visitors to consume exhibitions visually rather than, say, through touch. As archives
of histories – social, cultural, natural (constructed categories which of course overlap) –
museums engineer both large-scale remembering,14 as well as mass forgetting. The forgetting
occurs both when things have not been selected for collection – either through their being
overlooked, or because they pose practical difficulties for storing or exhibiting – and when
attributes of things collected are treated as incidental. The way objects in museum collections
smell, for example, is not typically the kind of thing that is actively preserved or for which there
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is a designated field within a museum database’s cataloguing system; as Constance Classen,
David Howes and Anthony Synnott note, ‘smell is probably the most undervalued sense in the
modern West’ (2-3), and Akira Mizuta Lippit observes the archival foundations of this: ‘The
inability to record and sustain the impressions of scent, their ephemerality, form the grounds for
their dismissal’ (123). Museums purport to retain information, and allow for it to be accessed,
recreated or transmitted, but in order to do this the information in question must be in a stable
– or stabilisable – form. This has affected the relative prominence of different senses within
epistemologies and archives, even as these priorities have undoubtedly contributed towards
uneven advances within preservation (and reproduction) technologies.15 Indeed, continuity can
be observed between the long-standing privileging of sight and sound within notions of ‘high art’
and museums, and the capacities of everyday digital technologies, such as smartphones. While
impressive in their ability to communicate visual and sonic information remotely, so far there
has been little mainstream demand to accelerate the technological advances that might enable
them to do this for taste, touch and smell (though experimental forays into these fields have
been happening).16 However, in a hypothetical world where dogs (say) were to design museums
or smartphones for their own use, the sensory modes informing the didactic and communicative
capacities of these technologies would be considerably different to those that humans are
accustomed to.17 Here whimsical thinking might be a strategy for highlighting multispecies
phenomenologies. While these by definition remain perpetually beyond the reach of any
embodied subject, acknowledging their existence precipitates a critique of anthropocentric
assumptions and hermeneutical overreach, and reserves space within discourses for an accepted
but unstable zone of unknown experience. Arguably an empirical vacuum rather than a more
typical epistemological gap, this is likely to resist the erosions of standard research, and it further
troubles the ethics and politics of de-extinction. Popular de-extinction discourses’ apparent
assumptions of broad perceptual commonality across species are all the more striking in the
context of research exploring differing sensory emphases, including Freud’s attempt to
demarcate humans from other animals to a significant extent on account of their predisposition to
rely on sight rather than smell (Freud 1961, 47; also see Lippit, 123). Whatever the failings or
otherwise of this theory, at the least it foregrounds how species vary in their sensory
experiences. If proponents of de-extinction are in fact considering species’ sensory differences –
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actual and potential, and both in terms of emphasis and differing experiences within the same
sense – then these should feature prominently in their public-facing discussions of approaches
and obstacles to de-extinction. Existing within what Eben Kirksey, Craig Schuetze and Stefan
Helmreich have termed ‘biocultural borderlands’ (13), de-extinction raises many ambiguities
which should not be ignored, even if by their very nature many of them cannot be solved.

Conclusion
Visual representations occupy a central but unstable position within de-extinction discourses.
While made by and for humans, they intervene within processes wherein inter- and intraspecies
interactions of nonhuman animals are the most critical. As well as dominating de-extinction
narratives, images also therefore signal a dearth at the heart of what is and can be understood
about extinct species, and ‘an impossible translation from the semiology of animals to that of
human beings’, to borrow Lippit’s phrase (122). While visual cultures constitute part of a
strategy to popularise de-extinction technologies, images are also potentially unruly, and can
unmask as well as sanitise accounts of experimentation with animals. Arguments in favour of deextinction therefore exhibit careful curation, minimising representations that might subvert the
optimistic narrative of these technologies and their potential outcomes, and prioritising those
that effect guilt at anthropogenic extinctions and wonder at biotechnological futures.
This instrumentalisation of images operates in tandem with the way in which they are
treated uncritically in de-extinction discourses. They are not framed as artefacts in their own
right, and as such the historical and ideological conditions that shape their representations are
overlooked by proponents of de-extinction. Further, the prominence of images within deextinction discourses inscribes stark disproportionalities among the aspects of candidate species
that these discourses engage with. The substantial privileging of visual sources does not simply
overlook their deceptions, but leads to undue emphasis on the way de-extinct animals might
look as compared to, say, what their scent might be. While this is an unsurprising consequence
of the limiting and anthropocentric structures of the archive, it carries new risks in the context
of de-extinction. Indeed, de-extinction itself stands to create a sort of anthropocentric archive,
wherein species deemed most interesting to humans are brought back, through processes that in
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turn focus disproportionate attention on the aspects of these species that seem most knowable,
measurable, or comprehensible to humans. However, what is valued by humans about
nonhuman animals does not necessarily align with what is important to nonhuman animals about
themselves or each other, and what these things are – and the extent to which they can be
detected, measured, or archived – is also uncertain. Indeed, archives and representations mark
the site of a circular paradox within de-extinction discourses. While some advocates of deextinction cite what could be learned from resurrected animals as a reason to bring them back, it
is this very missing information – behavioural, appearance-wise, what they smelled and sounded
like, and so on – that might vex de-extinction efforts. Indeed, if a primary motivation for these
species’ recovery is to convey information about them as they existed before, then de-extinct
animals themselves become representations of sorts.18
The neglect within de-extinction discourses of these discrepancies between different
species’ sensory worlds is both facilitated and naturalised by an anthropocentric gaze, which also
suppresses the subjectivity of nonhuman animals. Especially in this context, therefore, deextinction raises the possibility of a troubling reckoning, in which trans-species perceptional
differences precipitate devastating incoherence within the sensory economies of a resurrected
population. Animal agency might therefore disrupt a key stage of the de-extinction process:
even after initial technological difficulties of recreating individuals within a species appear to
have been overcome, viable intra- and interspecies interactions might not eventuate. And if deextinction fails to ‘make sense’ to the species being restored, then its implications for animal
rights are even more problematic.
Whatever the extent to which this transpires, unevenness in the sources
pertaining to candidate species, amplified by their selective use within de-extinction discourses,
arguably fosters skewed expectations as to what should or might result from experiments in
genetic rescue, and this research has raised questions around what constitutes a ‘successful’ deextinction, from whose perspective this gets to be assessed, and the extent to which such an
outcome is even humanly knowable. Such questions, I have argued, indicate the need for deextinction discourses to make space for multispecies phenomenologies. However, these should
not primarily be viewed as further technical puzzles for the science of de-extinction to attempt
to solve, but as respected arenas of animal agency and otherness for which humans – currently at
least – lack representational practices and experience.
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Notes
1

For example, eleven pages into How to Clone a Mammoth, Shapiro announces that this is not

actually possible: ‘We will never create an identical clone of a mammoth. Cloning... requires a
preserved living cell, and this is something that, for mammoths, will never be found’ (11).
2

It should be noted, however, that carvings of mammoths made from their ivory do survive

from the last glacial period (commonly referred to as ‘the Ice Age’; see
www.bradshawfoundation.com/sculpture/ivory_mammoth.php, accessed 10 January 2017).
Regardless of the presumed ‘likeness’ or otherwise of these sculptures, they speak to historical
entanglements of representation and interspecies interactions. Their existence also underscores
the lengthy provenance of technologies of visual representation that produce lasting artefacts, in
contrast with technologies that preserve impressions of sounds or smells.
3

Examples of this third category of visual representation were presented by Isabella Kirkland at

the TEDx DeExtinction conference, though she did not highlight the limits and deceptions of
images of extinct species.
4

Various details and conditions complicate these categories, however, including differences in

media and in source materials. For example, representations of a now-extinct species made
before it became extinct were not necessarily based on living individuals – John James Audubon
killed and positioned the birds that he rendered, while other images, such as those by J. G.
Keulemans of endemic New Zealand birds, were principally drawn from skins or taxidermy
models. Similarly, photographs could be of living or dead animals, and accompanying
descriptions – if these existed – were not always clear about which exactly it was that viewers
were looking at. Differences between local and global extinctions further blur all the categories,
as do ancient representations of animals (such as the small mammoth carvings), which – while
significant for many reasons – did not necessarily play roles in the devising of much later
‘scientific’ visual reconstructions of animals’ forms. Furthermore, the media used across these
different types of images are varied, having been affected not only by the differing demands of
representing species which still existed versus those already gone, but also by the extinction
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dates of the species in question. While moving images are possible in all three categories, which
type is used – film; animation; computer-generated imagery – depends upon whether the
species being represented is still around or not. Indeed, the lines between these media are by no
means clean, just as there are myriad overlaps between media such as painting and photography.
In short, images of extinct animals used within discourses of de-extinction embody rich
variation, yet tend to be indiscriminately juxtaposed, as if they were passive supporting materials
illustrating rather than acting upon the textual narratives.
5

This was not necessarily an individual memory, however, as some sources suggest that Martha

was born in captivity, in which case she would have been unfamiliar with passenger pigeons’
striking flocking behaviours.
6

Tracey Heatherington has noted the religious allusions within de-extinction discourses, in

particular in relation to the Frozen Ark project: ‘Here at the frontier of imaginary futures, the
moral and symbolic worlds of the Old Testament, environmentalism, and genomic science
awkwardly converge. Will our growing ability to intervene in nonhuman systems of
reproduction now offer redemption for the role humans have played in species
extinctions?’ (40).
7

While this term (and related versions, such as ‘magical realism’) is deployed increasingly

broadly, Matthew Strecher’s brief summary is useful here: ‘In a very simple nutshell, magical
realism is what happens when a highly detailed, realistic setting is invaded by something “too
strange to believe”’ (Strecher, 267). While this description appears in a discussion of
literature, it draws on visual allusions, and resonates especially with the photograph of the
mammoth diorama.
8

These were ‘mostly bone, with a bit of tissue and some hair’ (Shapiro, 86).

9

Indeed, Lorimer has noted a preoccupation with elephantine motifs within the work of

the Surrealists (135).
10

De-extinction science is not, of course, the only field interested in mammoth remains.
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11

This is contested, however, suggesting the subjective nature of what the appropriate criteria

are for determining that a species has successfully been de-extincted. Shapiro, for example, does
not accept that the bucarda should count as a successful de-extinction (142).
12

Fernández-Arias later noted that the lung defect could have been detected before birth,

allowing the team to plan for an immediate emergency operation which might have saved the
clone (see Shapiro, 143-144).
13

Indeed, it is instructive to note how different Martha’s colouration is implied to be by the

monochrome photograph discussed earlier, in comparison with the colouration suggested by
painted and taxidermy representations of passenger pigeons (which itself varies from
example to example).
14

Indeed, Donald Preziosi speaks of museums ‘re-membering’ histories, as fragments are pieced

back together in new configurations which – while frequently producing the illusion of
completeness – actually conceal huge gaps (101). This idea of ‘re-membering’ also resonates
with the placing of the tusks on the block containing the Jarkov mammoth’s remains.
15

While it is of course profoundly improbable that all sensory information is equal in terms of

the complexity of its preservability/reproducibility, scientific advances are uneven in part on
account of the political, economic and cultural conditions which fast-track some areas, while
neglecting or stymieing others.
16

For discussions of the relationship between odour and the archive, see Turkel.

17

These hypothetical museums or smartphones are differentiable from existing examples of

exhibitions, devices and applications designed largely by humans for canine use, though in some
cases these realised projects do have sensory emphases that diverge to some extent from
anthropocentric ‘norms’. For example, Dominic Wilcox’s art exhibition for dogs incorporated
scents, consumables and physical activities, as well as more typical gallery displays (see
dominicwilcox.com/portfolio/worlds-first-art-exhibition-for-dogs/, accessed 4 April 2017).
18

However, it is important to note that clear lines between ‘representation’ and ‘reality’,

whatever that is, are hard to plot and highly subjective.
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